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Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production:
Michael Cornstubble
I.INTRODUCTION
Of the many industries in which the U.S. trades
internationally, few can match the fervor created by
the automobile industry. More specifically, the rivalry
between U.S. and Japanese cars has historically been
one of the hottest debated topics across the United
States, and not surprisingly, a very personal issue for
the thousands of Americans employed in the U.S. big
three auto makers (Chrysler, Ford and General Motors)
and their many parts suppliers. After the oil crisis in
1973, Japanese cars became extremely popular
because of their fuel-efficient designs and excellent
reliability, leaving the American auto industry shaken.
They lost market share quickly, unprepared for the
changing demand in automobiles and lagging behind
the Japanese in quality. This loss in market share
continued into the 1980s, creating great concern
among those employed in the auto industry, as well as
the many Americans who shared a sense of pride in
American cars. This passionate sense of pride among
staunch U.S. automobile protectionists led to pressure
on the government by unions and other organizations
to protect the welfare of the U.S. auto industry. Most
protection has come in the form of tariffs or quotas on
imports. In early 1980, fueled by concern over the U.S.
auto industrys loss in market share, the U.S.
government asked Japan to impose voluntary export
restraints (VERs) of 1.68 million units on its
automobiles to the United States from 1982 until 1984.
Japan announced in May 1981 that it would comply
with the request.
While the VERs temporarily boosted and
protected the U.S. auto industrys market share, the
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VERs caused another significant effect that was
certainly unintended by the U.S. government. Sales
of Japanese cars actually increased in the coming years
because major Japanese automakers started up
domestic production in the United States. This paper
examines the reasons for increased Japanese auto
production in the United States.
This paper hypothesizes that the VERs of the
early 1980s were largely responsible for the
introduction of Japanese domestic production in U.S.
auto transplants and, until 1985, for their explosive
growth. Although the United States-requested VERs
expired in 1985 and import restrictions loosened
greatly, Japanese production in the United States
persisted at a heightened pace while exports
continually declined over the years following 1986
(Figure 1). The number of exports depicted in Figure
1 exceed the VER quota because these figures include
trucks, vehicles not covered under the VERs. The
author hypothesizes that after the VERs expired, the
reason for Japanese companies decisions to continue
domestic production changed. The appreciated yen that
skyrocketed after 1985 (Figure 2) became the factor
responsible for this persistent growth.
Section II will present background information
on the research by discussing the related economic
literature. Section III will discuss the theoretical
framework in this project. Section IV will describe
the sources of data and the data used in the empirical
model in Section V. Section VI will discuss the results
and the paper will conclude with remarks and
recommendations for future research in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
While many authors such as Goto, Collyns and
Dunaway, de Melo and Tarr, Krugman and Richardson
acknowledge VERs and the exchange rate as a major
reason for increased Japanese foreign direct investment
(FDI) in U.S. transplants, virtually no one has
performed a study to examine the VERs or the
yen-dollar exchange rates direct roles in influencing
domestic production decisions. Graham and Krugman
acknowledge both of my hypotheses as being true in
their book, Foreign Direct Investment, but give no
support for their assertion. Most literature about the
VERs of the early eighties seeks to quantify the
monetary/welfare costs associated with the quotas.
These costs were incurred because Japanese companies
were able to reap monopoly profits by the restricted
supply (Figure 3). In addition, Japanese companies
were able to raise their prices effectively and increase
profitability by exporting more well-equipped cars than
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before (Collyns 151). U.S. companies were also able
to raise their prices and make more profits although
to a lesser extent (Collyns 159). These additional costs
to the consumer in the form of inflated prices was the
cost of the trade restraints.
Literature by Ries suggests that the VERs had
a positive aspect for the Japanese companies because
of the windfall profits associated with the restricted
exports (Ries 259). A study by de Melo and Tarr also
found that the Japanese companies experienced
increased profits
because of the VERs.
This would suggest
that moving operations
to the United States in
order to boost
production would not
be wise since they were
earning inflated profits
with their restricted
supply, contrary to my
hypothesis. It is
important to point out
that although it may be
true that Japanese
companies profited during the times of the VERs, this
literature focuses only on the period of time while
VERs were at their highest (1982-1985), not on the
long run picture. In focusing only on the short run,
this literature has neglected the important issue that in
the automobile industry, the long run view is crucial
to the success of any company. This is because it is an
industry in which established market share is hard to
gain and is very important. In the next section on
theory, I will better address these arguments and
discuss why Japanese companies decided to move
production to the United States while apparently
earning increased profits because of the VERs.
It seems clear that with a void of literature
focusing directly on the research problem, the project
will be breaking new ground and focus on support by
theoretical and empirical evidence rather than past
research.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL
The model will include six main factors that
have affected the Japanese companies production
decisions in U.S. auto transplants the most. These main
explanatory variables are: 1) the VERs, 2) the
exchange rate, 3) wage rates in U.S. and Japanese auto
industries, 4) U.S. economic performance, 5) market
share of Japanese automobiles in the United States and
6) parts availability for producing the automobiles. In
this section, I develop a theoretical model that uses
these variables to explain the introduction and rise of
Japanese domestic production in U.S. auto transplants.
1) The VERs
Underlying
all analysis presented
in this paper is the
assumption that the
Japanese auto
producers are profit
maximizers. Even
though a short run
decision may create
short run windfall
profits, as is the
situation of the period
of VERs (Ries 259),
it may not create the highest profits in the long run
because the restricted supply results in loss of market
share and, therefore, may not be the best decision. In a
dynamic sense, domestic production must be more
profitable for the Japanese companies or else they
would not have made the shift in production.
During the period of VERs, imports were
limited at 1.68 million cars from 1981-1983, and 1.85
million cars in 1984 and 1985. Although VERs
officially continued after 1985 at the level of 2.3
million cars, they did not have a significant effect on
automakers decisions because import levels were well
below the VER level of 2.3 million units. As pointed
out previously, Japanese cars were in high demand in
the early 1980s, just as the VERs took effect. Under
the VERs, Japanese companies were faced with a fixed
supply under rising demand. This situation led to
higher prices for the automobiles, but does this mean
profitability went up as some suggest? After gaining
market share of 21.8% in 1981 from only 12.2% of
the industry sales three years earlier, Japanese
automobiles were clearly in rising demand. A study
by Collyns and Dunaway (1987) indicated that sales
Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production
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of Japanese automobiles would have been 45% higher
over the entire period of VERs in the absence of the
restrictions. It therefore seems very likely that the
profits Japanese companies were losing from a deficit
in sales more than outweighed any monopoly profits
earned because of the VERs. Being profit maximizers,
Japanese companies recognized this big problem and
searched for a way to supply more cars to the United
States. Furthermore, the Japanese companies did not
know whether the restrictions would be lifted or
increased further, putting more pressure on their future
earnings. Their answer was to create U.S. transplants
and they quickly began to move production overseas
to build cars exempt from the VERs, Honda being the
first in 1982, closely followed by others (Table 1).
The VERs seem to be the main motivating factor in
bringing production overseas.
2) The Exchange Rate
Until 1985, the dollar enjoyed a strong position
against the Japanese yen, but after 1985, the yen
appreciated rapidly and has continued in that direction
ever since (Table 2). Although economic theory would
suggest that under an appreciated dollar, it would be
less attractive for foreign companies to invest in the
United States, we observed considerable growth in FDI
in Japanese auto transplants that started in 1982 and
has continued ever since then. While the VER was the
main motivating factor in bringing Japanese
nameplates to U.S. transplants in the early eighties,
manufacturers incentives changed gears after 1985.
After 1985, VERs expired yet four more transplant
operations opened their doors. The problem for the
profit maximizing Japanese companies was no longer
a restricted supply, but rather an appreciated yen. With
a stronger yen, it takes more dollars to purchase
products imported from Japan. In other words,
Japanese goods would be more expensive relative to
domestic goods. If importing the automobiles from
Japan, companies would have to increase their prices
to maintain the same income because of the exchange
rate difference, but by doing this, they risk lowering
their sales. Although the Japanese were superior to
the United States in cost-cutting manufacturing
methods, trying to battle the effects of the appreciated
yen and remain profitable was a sizable challenge
(Collyns 1987, Crandall 1987). By moving production
to the United States, Japanese companies effectively
eliminated many of the exchange rate problems
associated with importing the automobiles. They could
take advantage of materials and labor that were
relatively cheaper for them because of the strength of
their currency, and thus control the prices of their
automobiles.
The trend was clear. Before 1985, Japanese
companies acted against what economic theory about
exchange rates suggests firms would do. Constrained
by the VERs, they invested heavily in the U.S. although
their currency was weak, but after 1985, the behavior
of the Japanese firms clearly complies with investment
theory. The VERs were highly instrumental in bringing
production of Japanese autos to the U.S., to the point
Cornstubble
Table 1 Japanese Automobile Assembly plants in the U.S.
Japanese Company Location Start year
Honda Maryville, OH 1982
Nissan Smyrna, TN 1983
NUMMI (Toyota and GM) Fremont, CA 1984
Mazda Flat Rock, MI 1987
Toyota Georgetown, KY 1988
Diamond Star (Mitsubishi and Chrysler) Normal, IL 1988
Subaru-Isuzu Lafayette, IN 1989
Nissan-Ford Avon Lake, OH 1991
Source: Kenney and Florida. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.
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of outweighing the effects of the unfavorable exchange
rate, and the appreciated yen has been highly
instrumental in sustaining their growth in domestic
production. This trend will be supported by empirical
data later in the paper.
3) Real wage in each countrys auto industry
Labor costs are obviously a very important
consideration for automobile companies since they
account for a large part of manufacturing costs. As
profit maximizing companies, the Japanese companies
would want to produce where the labor was the
cheapest, unless other benefits outweighed a higher
labor cost. Table 2 shows a comparison between the
wages in the United States and Japan measured with
indices that control the exchange rate. The ratio of the
two indices shows this relationship. As the number
decreases, wages are either increasing in Japan or
decreasing in the United States. By looking at the
indices, one can easily see that wages have risen much
more quickly in Japan than in the United States. In
fact, until recently, wages in the United States remained
quite constant while wages in Japan have risen almost
every year. Wages have been pushed up in Japan over
the last decade largely because of a labor shortage
there. This situation makes producing autos in the U.S.
ideal for the Japanese companies. As the ratio of wages
has been getting smaller, the amount of Japanese
nameplate autos produced in the United States has been
getting larger. Therefore, the wage rate may also be
an important factor that is responsible for the growing
transplant production in the United States.
Although productivity considerations are
important for companies, this measure is left out of
my paper. This is for two reasons. First, a suitable and
reliable productivity measure, such as unit labor cost
is difficult to obtain. Second, I feel comfortable in
leaving this measure out because studies have shown
(Kenney and Florida 1991, Goto 1990) that Japanese
companies have been highly successful in transferring
their efficient production methods to the United States.
Kenney and Florida noted nearly identical productivity
in the Honda plant in the U.S. as in Japan. Therefore,
productivity may not be much of an issue for Japanese
companies deciding whether or not to move production
to the U.S.
4) U.S. Real GDP
Automobiles are a big-ticket durable good so
they are highly sensitive to changes in the overall state
Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production
Table 2 Comparison of Real Wages in Auto Industries of U.S. and Japan
Year U.S. (1979 = 100) Japan (1979 = 100) Index Ratio
1979 100 100 1
1980 108.68 106.27 1.023
1981 105.11 107.52 .978
1982 105.16 110 .956
1983 103.22 111.38 .927
1984 102.68 112.42 .913
1985 103.17 113.25 .911
1986 102.13 115.96 .881
1987 101.74 116.55 .873
1988 100.89 121.34 .831
1989 98.61 122.22 .807
1990 97.02 121.68 .797
1991 97.57 128.7 .758
1992 98.07 132.27 .741
1993 101.88 126.32 .807
1994 105.26 125.35 .840
Source: Wards Automotive Yearbook, Multiple Volumes, data adjusted for inflation with CPI (1987 = 100)
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of the economy. Theory would suggest that we would
observe lags in production when the economy is at its
worst and boosts in production when it is healthy. For
example, in a recession, many consumers are uneasy
about their current financial state and will not make a
large investment in an automobile, whereas during a
period of high consumer confidence, buyers will be
more likely to make a large purchase. However, in
the U.S. auto transplants, production has increased
every year, some years at an incredible pace, even
through recessions. Although growth rates are not
consistent with the growth rates of the economy, one
can see by observing figure 4 that the general trends
of the growth rates in domestic Japanese production
at least somewhat follow the trends of the economy,
especially during the recession of 1990 and 1991 when
transplant production plunged. The inconsistencies in
the growth pattern of Japanese auto production in the
U.S. as compared to the growth pattern of the economy
can be mostly explained by three main factors: 1)
demand for Japanese cars has been high, 2) Japanese
companies have relied more and more on domestic
production in U.S. transplants to meet the needs of the
U.S. market, and 3) during this time Japanese
companies were in the process of setting up new
factories that would obviously cause a great growth
in production as they started up operations for the first
time.
With the first factor, it has already been
established that Japanese cars were in high demand.
With such a high demand, we would expect to see them
less affected than less desirable cars by changes in the
economy. The second factor is important in explaining
why growth rates of transplant production have been
much more active than growth in the economy. As
noted before, the Japanese have been exporting fewer
cars to the United States each year and producing more
domestically since 1986 (see Figure 1). These
increases in local production are therefore not only an
indicator of high demand for Japanese cars but also of
the companies new found reliance on domestic
production to meet the needs of the North American
market because it is more profitable for them to
produce here. Regardless of economic trends, the
Japanese were producing more of their cars in the
United States and less in Japan. The third factor is
Cornstubble
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very obvious. Once a new transplant started
production, there would be a sudden increase in the
number of cars produced, making the growth rate
appear abnormally high for that year or the next. Years
of massive growth such as 1985 and 1989 are evidence
of this effect. NUMMI started in 1984 and Diamond
Star, Toyota , and Subaru-Isuzu all started in 1988
and 1989 and account for the observed abnormally
high growth rates.
5) Market Share
To further address the issue of whether the
Japanese profited by the VERs, one must consider the
implications of losing market share in the auto industry.
Ries, de Melo, and Tarr did not consider the importance
of market share in their study in which they concluded
that Japanese companies profited by the VERs. Since
automobiles are products that are frequently very brand
loyal buyers items, automakers play close attention
to market share which can be considered a rough proxy
for preference of automobiles. Once a person purchases
a car, assuming the experience was positive, they are
more likely to purchase that brand of car again rather
than another car. Under VERs, Japanese market share
was restricted meaning some customers who would
have purchased a Japanese car ended up substituting
with an American one. This loss in market share is
difficult to recover. Since these VERs hit at a time
when demand for Japanese cars was just starting to
explode (see Figure 1), the Japanese had no choice
but to respond by shifting production overseas to avoid
the VERs and regain profits and market share.
Another important aspect to consider is that
with a limited number of exports, companies could
not expand their product line offerings without
reducing the exports of another model. Moving
production of the most popular high-volume cars to
the U.S., such as Toyotas Corolla or Nissans Sentra,
freed up space under the quota and allowed the
Japanese to continue plans to offer new imports such
as luxury cars, sports cars, and sport utility vehicles
without compromising the sales of other models.
Observation of this trend is the fact that the total
production of the Japanese companies has increased
greatly with more types of models offered than ever.
The current trend is that most high volume cars are
now produced in the U.S. while the more expensive
models are reserved for production in Japan.
Once the Japanese regained their market share,
we would expect to see them continue to try to increase
their market share, not level off. This is because, as
profit maximizing companies, they would have an
incentive to continue to increase their sales and earn
more profits. In other words, when the going is good,
the good keep going, which is certainly the case we
see with Japanese auto makers who hold about 30%
of the U.S. car market now, about double what they
held fifteen years earlier (Wards 1996).
6) Parts availability
In Japan, auto producers utilize a close-knit
system of suppliers. Within this system, suppliers who
meet the needs of the Japanese companies unique
work organization are highly reliant on just-in-time
(JIT) inventory systems. The requirements of suppliers
under this system are much more demanding than
traditional U.S. auto manufacturing. In the early
1980s, many U.S. suppliers were inadequate for the
Japanese transplants because they lacked the
knowledge or experience with this type of work
organization or JIT, or they were just unwilling to
comply (Florida and Kenney 106). We would then
expect this to be a factor that discourages Japanese
companies from manufacturing here. What is observed
by Florida and Kenney (1991) is that many Japanese
companies have strongly encouraged their suppliers
in Japan to set up shops in the United States in order
to meet their needs. These suppliers, together with the
growing number of U. S. companies that accommodate
the Japanese organization, make up the first-tier
suppliers for the Japanese, allowing them to
manufacture successfully in the United States. This
development has been highly significant in attracting
domestic Japanese production.
Before Japanese parts suppliers moved to the
United States and U.S. companies adapted to a JIT
system, the Japanese imported their engines and
drivetrains already assembled. They would in some
instances essentially ship disassembled cars over that
simply needed to be screwed together to be ready
for sale. This system worked well for the Japanese
because while VERs were at their highest, there were
never any restrictions on parts imports. Although this
system was not as efficient as the supplier networks
transplants utilize now, this alternative was the best
for Japanese companies to increase supply while under
Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production
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the restrictions of the VERs. Since then, the Japanese
companies producing in the United States now take
advantage of the favorable exchange rate and improved
supplier network and use many more U.S. made parts
in their automobiles (Florida and Kenney 109).
IV. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION
Quarterly time series data from 1980, fourth
quarter to 1994 are used in the empirical model. This
period was chosen because it starts two years before
transplant production began and ends with the most
recent data available. Data utilized in this project were
acquired overwhelmingly from yearly volumes of
Wards Automotive Yearbook. These specific data
include transplant production, number of imports,
market share, and automotive industry wage rates.
Data about the U.S. economy were extracted from the
websites of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (US
BEA) and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, the
1995 edition of World Tables and the 1995 edition of
Business Statistics of the U.S. Exchange rate data were
also acquired from the website of the US BEA. Finding
detailed parts supplier data that indicate their country
of origin and main customers proved to be a huge task
beyond the scope of this paper, as Kenney and Florida
indicated in their research (107). Hence, this paper
will have to rely simply on a theoretical analysis of
the parts suppliers issue, without empirical data to
support the theory.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Two main hypotheses emerge from theory:
1) The VER was the factor responsible for
bringing Japanese production  to the U.S. and, until
1985 when they expired, for the explosive growth in
production.
2) The appreciation of the yen after 1985,
coinciding with the expiration of the VERs, took over
as the main factor that sustained and increased growth
in domestic production of Japanese cars in U.S.
transplants.
This section presents the empirical model indicated
by theory. The same variables discussed in theory will
be incorporated in the model with the exception of the
parts variable for reasons described earlier. An OLS
multiple regression analysis is used to determine
whether the variables explain the hypotheses that are
supported by theory. The regression equation takes the
form:
PRODUCTION
TRANSPLANTS
 = α0 + β1VER +β2YEN/$(VER)+ β3WAGE + β4GDP + β5MKT
Below, each variable is discussed individually in
accordance with the two hypotheses put forward
earlier. Table 3 defines the variables of the regression
equation.
Independent Variable 1: VER
A dummy variable was utilized in the
regression analysis to capture the effects of a VER.
Before a VER is implemented, maximum exports were
theoretically determined by total U.S. demand for new
cars. Although there were production capacity limits,
the companies were allowed to export all the cars they
wanted without a VER. While under the VER, a
company had a specified limit on automobiles they
could import. In a nut shell, either it was on or it was
off.  A value of zero was given for years in which
there was a VER, and a value of one was given for
years in which a VER was not in effect. These values
were chosen because the next variable, YEN/$, is an
interactive variable that utilizes the VER variable to
turn the variable on only during the period of no VERs.
The importance of this will be explained fully in the
description of the Yen/$ variable.
The VER variable was lagged by two years,
or eight quarters, in the equation. A lag was
incorporated in the equation because it takes time for
companies to set up a factory in the states and begin
production. A lag of two years returned the best results
for both this variable and the others. The expected sign
of this variable is negative. While restricted by the
VERs, we expect to see Japanese companies producing
more in U.S. auto transplants because of their profit
confining supply shortages, than when they are not
restricted.
Independent Variable 2: YEN/$(VER)
This interactive variable measures the effects
Cornstubble
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of the Yen/$ exchange rate after the period of VERs, a
factor hypothesized to greatly influence production in
the United States. Since I hypothesize that this variable
is responsible for increases in production only after
the period of VERs, this variable is effectively turned
off during the period of VERs through this interaction.
Since the VER variable takes on the value of zero
during VERs and one during non-VER years, the
variable is only activated during the period of
non-VER years. This interaction effect is very
important in supporting the hypothesis since it isolates
the period in question.
This variable was lagged two years like the
VER variable for the same reasons. Exchange rates
move very quickly and companies deciding to produce
in the U.S. because of the more favorable exchange
rate needed time to set up and produce in the states.
Furthermore, since exchange rates can be rather
volatile, companies would want to observe the patterns
of the exchange rate for a while before making a major
decision like moving production overseas. Companies
like Toyota, Subaru-Isuzu, and Mitsubishi all arrived
about two years after the yen appreciated greatly. The
expected sign of this variable is negative because as
the Yen/$ exchange rate increases (more yen to buy a
dollar), it would be more expensive to produce in the
United States and companies would choose to produce
where it is cheapest.
Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production
Table 3 Variable Definitions and their Expected Signs
Variable Type Explanation Expected Sign
PRODUCTION
TRANSPLANTS
Dependent Number of Japanese nameplate
autos produced in U.S. transplants
VER Independent Dummy variable indicating when     Negative
VERs were in effect.  Takes on
value of 0 during VERs, 1 otherwise
YEN/$ (VER) Independent Interactive variable that measures     Negative
the Yen/$ exchange rate during the
period of no VERs.  The value of this
variable is multiplied by the value of
the VER variable, effectively turning
off the variable during the period of
VERs and turning it on during the
period of no VERs to isolate the
production period hypothesized to be
most affected by the exchange rate.
WAGE Independent U.S./Japan ratio constructed with      Negative
indicies of real domestic wages in
auto production industries of U.S.
and Japan
GDP Independent Real U.S. GDP in constant 1987      Positive
dollars
MKT Independent Japanese companies market share      Positive
of all automobiles sold in the U.S.
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WAGE is a ratio that measures the level of
wages in the auto industries of the U.S. and Japan
against one another. This variable is included because
labor is a major factor cost in producing automobiles
and affects decisions to produce in the United States.
Since an increase in the value of this variable indicates
either wages are increasing in the United States or
decreasing in Japan, the expected sign of this
coefficient is negative. This is because if U.S. wages
increase relative to Japanese wages, we would
hypothesize that this would cause the Japanese
companies to produce where labor is cheaper (in
Japan), thus inhibiting transplant production and
resulting in a negative sign.
Independent Variable 4: GDP
GDP was included in the regression equation
because, as explained in the theory section, demand
for big-ticket durable goods, like automobiles, is
affected by the state of the economy. Therefore, this
variable had to be included to control for changes in
production caused by changes in the state of the
economy. The expected sign for this variable is
positive, since one would expect to see more vehicles
being demanded with a healthy economy. This variable
was not lagged because the auto industry responds
immediately to changes in demand for autos by
adjusting production accordingly. Furthermore, GDP
does not need to be lagged because it was not
responsible for bringing transplants to the U.S., but it
has affected production decisions in them and needs
to be included in the model.
Independent Variable 5: MKT
MKT is the Japanese automakers market
share of all cars sold in the United States. This variable
was also lagged two years in the regression. The MKT
variable was included in the regression because, as
explained earlier in the theory section, market share is
a very important consideration for automobile
companies because it can be considered a rough proxy
for preference in automobiles. The expected sign for
this variable is positive. While arguments can be made
for causality to run both ways, i.e. for increases in
production to cause increases in market share, or
increases in market share to fuel increases in
production, I will be arguing the latter. First of all, as
market share increases, Japanese companies are
obviously selling more vehicles. These increases in
production allow companies to take advantage of
economies of scale. Since many of the costs of
producing an automobile are fixed, such as start up
costs with the factories and operational costs of running
the factory, additional automobiles can be produced
cheaper as production increases. In other words, the
costs can be spread over more and more automobiles
and profits can be maximized. Also, as peoples
preferences for Japanese automobiles increases, i.e.
as their market share increases, Japanese companies
would respond by increasing their production to meet
the demand and expand their market share.
VI. RESULTS
The regression was corrected for auto
correlation with the Hildreth-Lu method and run with
OLS estimation. The results of the equation are given
in Table 4. The analysis returned mixed results, with
all variables but one resulting in the predicted sign.
All variables are significant and the adjusted R squared
is high, at .94. The results of each variable and how
they apply to the hypotheses will be discussed in this
section of the paper.
Hypothesis one was not supported by the
results of this model. The VER variable returned with
a coefficient of 265922.81, the wrong sign, and was
significant. This result means that under the VERs,
the model predicts that the Japanese produced about
265,922 less autos in the U.S. than they would have
without the VERs. Although this result was
unexpected, it is not necessarily disappointing.
This unexpected result may be explained by
re-examining U. S. transplant production (Figure 1).
VERs were in effect 1981, 82, 83, 84, and 85. With
the two year lag incorporated in the model, the
observed years with VERs are therefore 1983, 84, 85,
86, and 87. A look at the production figures shows
that although during the period of VERs we see
significant growth in transplant production, the
non-VER years following 1987 have even greater
growth in production. This observation is a reflection
of the increased number of producers in the non-VER
years than in VER years. By 1989, there were seven
different transplants in production, but in 1987, only
Cornstubble
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four were operating. With three more transplants in
production after the period of VERs, obviously there
would be more production than before.
With that said, it still does not explain why
the results do not support the hypothesis that the VERs
brought production
to the U.S. and
caused growth in
production. For
support of this
hypothesis, one
must look at the
statistics and rely on
theory and the
literature   of  other
researchers more
than the results of
this model. Let us
take this in steps.
First of all, it is clear
that before the
VERs there was no
t r a n s p l a n t
production and
during the VER
period, four
transplants came to
the U.S. Next, it
seems obvious that
the Japanese
companies were not
moving to the U.S.
during the early
eighties because of
the exchange rate.
During that time,
the high Yen/$ exchange rate made production in the
U.S. more expensive than production in Japan. With
these two important observations and the previous
discussion in the paper in mind, I still maintain that
the VERs were responsible for bringing the first four
transplants to the U. S. and creating growth in
transplant production.
A favorable exchange rate for the Japanese that
almost perfectly coincided with the expiration of the
VERs made transplant production more attractive and
led to the introduction of new companies and even
greater growth in production than before. So yes, there
was less production in VER years than in non-VER
years, as the model predicted, but this result does not
completely reject the hypothesis. Although production
was smaller during VERs, it seems that they were still
responsible for bringing over at least four transplants
and for the growth
in production in
those plants during
the VERs.
Hypothesis
two, however, was
upheld very well by
the empirical
model. The
exchange rate
returned with a
coefficient of
-1090.71 and is
significant at the
.0001 level. While
the coefficient
appears to be small,
the model predicts
that an increase in
the yen/$ exchange
rate of one yen per
dollar results in a
decrease of
t r a n s p l a n t
production of 1091
cars. One yen is a
very small amount
of money, about a
penny. To put this in
better perspective,
the model predicts
that from 1985 to 1986, when the yen appreciated
suddenly, production in transplants increased by
76,500 cars solely because of the rapid appreciation
of the yen, a significant amount.
The wage rate also returned with a coefficient
of the predicted sign, but with a larger coefficient of
-208729.23, also significant at the .0001 level. The
model predicts that an increase in the ratio of wages
of one (which indicates a doubling of the U.S. wages
relative to Japanese wages) would result in a reduction
of production of about 209,000 cars in one year, ceteris
paribus. Since labor is a major factor cost in
Table 4 Regression Results
Independent Variables Estimated Coefficient
VER 265922.81
(5.2617)
YEN/$ (VER) -1090.71
(4.9434)
WAGE -208729.23
(6.3095)
GDP 65.17
(21.7502)
MKT 11502.18
(6.3043)
Constant -291790.90
(11.9766)
Adjusted R2 .94
Durbin-Watson 1.87
t-statistics are in parenthesis
all are significant to the .0001 level
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manufacturing an automobile, it seems that the
Japanese companies have placed a lot of importance
on the relative wage rate when making production
decisions, more than the author originally expected.
An important observation of this result is that this
model predicts that relative wage was significant
during the entire production span of the transplants,
not just after the VERs expired. Therefore, relative
wage seems to have influenced production decisions
even during the period of VERs, an unexpected result.
Despite this reservation, these two factors, the Yen/$
exchange rate and the real wage rates in each country,
both are supported as being very important factors in
determining U.S. transplant production decisions, with
the Yen/$ exchange rate significant only after the VERs
expired.
The GDP
variable was very
significant with a
coefficient of 65.17. The
model predicts that an
increase of a dollar in the
real GDP of the U.S.
results in an increase of
transplant production of
about 65 cars. This small
coefficient indicates that
in and of itself, the state
of the economy is not influencing the large growth in
U.S. auto transplant production, unlike the other
variables, but the high significance is evidence that
production trends are affected by the state of the
economy, exactly as was hypothesized.
Finally, the MKT variable also was highly
significant and had a coefficient of 11502.18. With
each percentage point gained in market share, the
model predicts that production increased by about
11,502 cars. As preference leaned towards Japanese
automobiles and their market share increased,
Japanese companies responded by increasing
production in auto transplants. While a variety of
factors could be responsible for the increased demand
or preference towards Japanese automobiles, the fact
remains that as market share increased for the
Japanese, they had an incentive to continue that growth
and increase their production in the U.S. as the model
predicts.
In trying to evaluate the results of the model, I
realize that the study supports hypothesis two with
some small reservations. First and foremost, it seems
that during the times of VERs, only one goal existed
for the Japanese companies, to increase supply which
would maximize profits. During this period, the
exchange rate was not the most important factor, and
neither was the wage rate. However, after 1985, when
the VERs expired, the Japanese companies had a
choice. They were allowed to export as many vehicles
as they wanted or they could produce locally. As this
study has shown, Japanese companies went with the
latter decision, meaning that it was the most profitable
for them. Multiple factors were important
considerations during this time, factors like relative
wage, and probably others that were not captured by
the regression equation,
such as parts origin and
productivity issues. This
differentiates it greatly
from the period of VERs
where essentially only
one variable, the VER,
was an issue. As for
improving the results of
hypothesis one, it proved
to be intractable in my
empirical estimation,
again because of the
difficulty in measuring other strategic decision
variables.
VII. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED FU-
TURE RESEARCH
This paper analyzes the introduction and rapid
growth of production in Japanese auto transplants in
the United States. Two hypotheses were developed,
both of which were strongly developed using basic
profit-maximizing motivation and supply and demand
theories. However, only hypothesis two was supported
by the results of the empirical analysis. Despite the
unexpected results from the empirical model for
hypothesis one, the results were not disappointing.
Hypothesis one is best supported by theory and
observation of trends in production rather than the
empirical model in my project. In the results section,
the reasons for this were discussed at length, but it
It is clear that transplant pro-
duction was the answer for
Japanese companies to in-
crease supply and increase
their  penetration into the U.S.
auto market.
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comes down to the fact that during the VERs, the
Japanese companies had one goal in mind: increase
supply to maximize their profits that were restricted
by the VERs. It is clear that transplant production was
their answer to increase supply and increase their
penetration of the U.S. auto market. Despite the lack
of support by the empirical model, hypothesis one is
well supported by this project.
The second hypothesis was supported both
theoretically and empirically. The results of the
empirical model fully supported the theory that the
exchange rate was responsible for increases in
transplant production. Even stronger results could be
achieved if one remembers that, unlike during the
period of restricted imports, Japanese companies had
a choice of whether they wanted to produce in the
United States or not. In deciding to produce locally,
the Japanese had several factors to consider, not just
one, as is the case of the VER in the early eighties.
Although the model did not return an extremely high
coefficient for the exchange rate variable itself, the
exchange rate is still very significant in production
decisions because all of these factors relate to the
exchange rate. This is because their prices (and
consequently their effect on company profitability) are
all affected by changes in the yen/$ exchange rate.
Therefore, the results of the model can still be
interpreted to support hypothesis two since all input
factors that encouraged Japanese companies to produce
more since 1986 are affected by the exchange rate.
In future research on this topic, an empirical
model that captures more of these other variables
would be ideal for very strong expected results. One
major factor that could not be captured in the empirical
model was parts considerations, such as their country
of origin and the number of transplant producers.
However, as stated earlier, finding data as specific as
this is difficult at best. Perhaps including a productivity
measure, such as unit labor cost, would be beneficial
to the analysis also, although relative wage is a rough
proxy for productivity. Other recommendations for the
researcher with ample time and access to very specific
data on the auto industry would be to investigate how
each company was affected by the VERs individually
and how that affected their order of entry into the U.S.
transplant market. Another interesting avenue of
research would be to investigate the price elasticities
of demand for the Japanese companies to predict which
models would be produced in the U.S. and to calculate
exactly how much profit they were gaining or losing
because of the VERs.
This paper has addressed one of the most
significant issues in the automobile industry and
explained it with economic theory supported fairly well
by empirical evidence. This study took a commonly
observed trend in the auto industry and compiled and
tested variables that help to explain this phenomena.
Few authors have looked directly at the effects of the
VERs and the exchange rate and how they have
affected U.S. transplant decisions, but many have
simply referred to the trend as given without upholding
their theory. This paper has finally answered with
considerable certainty why the Japanese have shifted
much of their production to the United States. The
interesting results from this paper can help everyone
to better understand the transitioning U.S. automobile
industry and the factors that have contributed to its
transformation.
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